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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1726 
_____________ 
 
CHERYL A. SLATER, 
                               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY; SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITY; SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY PRISON BOARD; DONALD STEWART; 
WILLIAM BRENNAN; TEAMSTERS LOCAL 229; and JACK MCGRAIL 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 3:07-cv-02304) 
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2011 
 
Before:  FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges and POGUE, Judge.
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(Filed: January 9, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
1
 Honorable Donald C. Pogue, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade, 
sitting by designation. 
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 Cheryl Slater appeals the District Court’s entry of judgment in favor of seven 
municipal and union officers and entities on her claims of employment discrimination 
and retaliation.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write solely for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition. 
 Slater has worked as a correctional officer at the Susquehanna County 
Correctional Facility since 1994.  The prison is a subdivision of Susquehanna County and 
is superintended by the Susquehanna Prison Board.  William Brennan and Donald 
Stewart were wardens at the prison during Slater’s employment.  Teamsters Local Union 
229 is the bargaining representative for correctional officers employed by Susquehanna 
County.  Jack McGrail is the union’s business representative.  
 Two sets of factual circumstances underlie Slater’s claims.  First, in early 2004, 
Slater refused to attest to her receipt and understanding of the prison’s Policy and 
Procedure Manual.  She believed that prison rules were not properly enforced and 
therefore refused to provide a signature acknowledging her understanding of the manual.  
As a consequence, William Brennan, the prison warden at the time, suspended her for 
three days and referred her to a psychiatrist for evaluation.  She eventually signed under 
protest and wrote a letter to the Prison Board to inform them of the incident and express 
her disapproval of the lax enforcement of prison rules.  Later that year, she was 
interviewed by an investigator about the death of an inmate in the prison.  Brennan was 
present for at least part of the interview.  Slater alleges that Brennan’s presence at the 
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interview was related to her letter to the Prison Board, but offers no evidence to support 
the inference.  Second, Slater testified that a group of other correctional officers at the 
prison — self-titled the “secret sisters” because they gave gifts to each other to boost 
morale — harassed her by posting postcards of middle-aged women in bathing suits near 
her work area.  She also testified that the group manufactured false accusations about her. 
Three episodes preceded Slater’s termination on December 1, 2006.2  In October 
2006, Slater permitted an out-of-state police officer to enter the prison intake area without 
first disarming him or checking his identification.  This was a violation of prison security 
policy, and Slater received a five-day suspension for her actions.  The following month, 
she twice violated policies directed to prisoners’ medical care by permitting an inmate to 
change the bandage of another inmate with a contagious infectious disease and by 
improperly disposing of contaminated medical gloves.     
Slater initiated this action in the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania on December 21, 2007.  Against all defendants, the complaint asserted 
federal claims of (1) retaliation for exercising First Amendment speech rights, brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) conspiracy to retaliate for exercising First Amendment 
speech rights, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (3) age-based discrimination, 
retaliation, and creation of a hostile work environment under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (c)(3); and (4) gender-based 
discrimination, retaliation, and creation of a hostile work environment under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (c)(3).  The complaint also 
                                              
2
 Slater was 57 years old when the prison terminated her employment. 
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alleged state law claims of conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
wrongful discharge, and discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.   
In three memoranda and orders issued in July 2008, March 2009, and February 
2011, the District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment on all claims.  Slater filed this timely appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s orders granting a motion to dismiss, Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 
672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010), and summary judgment, Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 
(3d Cir. 2008).  In so doing, we apply the standard that the District Court was obliged to 
apply.  On review of the grant of a motion to dismiss, “we accept as true all well-pled 
factual allegations . . . and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.”  
Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate only where there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  On 
summary judgment, a court “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in that party’s favor.”  N.J. 
Transit Corp. v. Harsco Corp., 497 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III. 
Slater appeals the District Court’s dismissal or entry of summary judgment on the 
§ 1983 claim for retaliation for engaging in protected speech, the § 1985 claim for 
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conspiracy to retaliate, the discriminatory discharge claim under the ADEA, and the 
gender- and age-based hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the ADEA.   
A. 
 Slater first contests the entry of judgment for the defendants on her claim, brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that she endured retaliation for engaging in speech 
protected by the First Amendment.  She maintains that because she wrote to the Prison 
Board on a matter of public concern, the defendants willfully conspired to send her to a 
psychiatrist, impose a suspension on her, manufacture false accusations about her, and 
arrange for termination of her employment.    
 “[T]he First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain 
circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”  Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006).  To state a claim of retaliation for engaging in 
protected expression, a public employee must show that her expressive activity is covered 
by the First Amendment and that it substantially influenced the alleged retaliatory action.  
Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005).  The District Court granted 
judgment for the defendants on Slater’s claim because her letter to the Prison Board was 
not protected by the First Amendment. 
 A public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment when she speaks 
as a citizen about a matter of public concern.  Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 
—, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2493 (2011) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).  
Slater contends that the criticism of the lax enforcement of prison rules contained within 
her letter to the Prison Board was a matter of public concern.  The argument is dubious 
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insofar as the letter only alleges, non-specifically, that many of the rules in the Policy and 
Procedure Manual went unenforced.  Appendix (“App.”) 681.  But even if Slater’s 
conclusory critiques of the prison’s general noncompliance with its rules addresses a 
matter of public concern, there is no dispute that the letter was written in Slater’s capacity 
as an employee, not as a citizen.  The letter — sent privately “in response” to Slater’s 
suspension and in order to “set the record straight” — is concerned with a particular 
personnel action.  Id.  It does not advance values safeguarded by the First Amendment by 
promoting public discourse or expressing an informed opinion in a public forum, but 
rather involves a matter of “personal interest.”  Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45.  Slater’s 
speech, therefore, is not protected by the First Amendment, and the District Court 
correctly entered judgment for the defendants on her § 1983 claim.  
B. 
Slater next contends that the District Court erred in dismissing her claim of 
conspiracy to retaliate for engaging in protected speech, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
1985(3).  To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege “(1) a conspiracy; (2) 
for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of 
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or 
property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.”  United 
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983).  The second 
component of the test requires the plaintiff to allege that the conspiracy was motivated by 
racial, gender, or other class-based discriminatory animus.  Farber v. City of Paterson, 
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440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1242-44 (3d Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 
(1979) (holding that conspiracies motivated by gender-based animus are actionable under 
§ 1985).  The District Court dismissed Slater’s § 1985 claim on the basis that she failed to 
allege that the defendants conspired to retaliate against her because of her gender.  This 
conclusion is sound.  The complaint alleges that the defendants wished to retaliate against 
Slater because of her whistle-blowing activities, not because of her membership in a class 
protected by the statute.  Dismissal of the § 1985 claim was proper. 
C. 
Slater next contests the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on her claim that she was terminated because of her age.  The ADEA makes it 
unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s 
age” and for a union to “cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an 
individual” because of her age.  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (c)(3).  As Slater lacks direct 
evidence of intentional age discrimination, we evaluate her ADEA claim under the 
burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973).  See Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009).  This 
framework places upon the plaintiff the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case 
of discrimination.  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).  
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 
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employment action.  Id.  To prevail, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant’s legitimate reason was in fact pretext for discrimination.  Id. 
Slater established a prima facie case of age discrimination by demonstrating that 
she was over 40, was qualified to serve as a correctional officer, suffered an adverse 
employment action, and was replaced by an employee sufficiently young enough to 
support an inference of age-based discriminatory animus.  See Smith, 589 F.3d at 689 
(setting forth the elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA).
3
   
The defendants satisfied their burden by proffering evidence that Slater was terminated 
for permitting an armed individual into the prison intake area and by twice violating 
prison policies governing the medical care of prisoners.  
Slater’s claim falters for lack of evidence that these legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons were pretext for age discrimination.  To defeat summary judgment, Slater was 
required either to adduce evidence of discrimination or discredit the reasons proffered for 
her termination.  Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2005).  She introduced no 
evidence that she was fired because of her age.  Rather, she endeavored to cast doubt 
upon the justifications for her discharge by denying that she was responsible for the entry 
of an armed police officer into the prison and by insisting that she properly disposed of 
the contaminated medical gloves.  But to discredit the basis for her discharge, she “cannot 
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 Slater stated in an affidavit submitted in opposition to summary judgment that she was 
replaced by a 38-year-old employee.  App. 725.  The District Court did not acknowledge 
the statement, but we assume that it satisfied the fourth component of a prima facie case 
of age discrimination.  See Smith, 589 F.3d at 689.  On appeal, Slater argues only that she 
established a prima facie case of age discrimination; she does not dispute the District 
Court’s conclusion that she failed to establish pretext. 
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simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 
32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).  Rather, she must “demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find them unworthy of credence . . . and hence infer that the employer did not act for [the 
asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.”  Id. (citations omitted).  In light of profuse 
testimony by her coworkers and supervisors that she did, in fact, permit an armed trooper 
to enter the prison and improperly dispose of used medical gloves, Slater failed to 
surmount this “difficult burden.”  Id.  A reasonable jury could not conclude, from Slater’s 
testimony alone, that the defendants’ legitimate reasons were implausible, inconsistent, 
incoherent, contradictory, or otherwise a pretext for discharging her because of her age.   
D. 
 Finally, Slater contends that the District Court erred in concluding that she was not 
subjected to a hostile work environment because of her gender and age.  Title VII makes 
it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] . 
. . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex” 
and for a union to “to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an 
individual” because of her gender.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (c)(3).  Hostile work 
environment claims based on allegations of sexual harassment fall within the ambit of 
Title VII’s proscriptions on workplace discrimination.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 
U.S. 17, 21 (1993).  “[W]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
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conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, Title 
VII is violated.”  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002) 
(quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21) (quotation marks omitted).  We assume, without 
deciding, that the ADEA makes available a hostile work environment claim for age-based 
discrimination, analyzed under the same standards as a Title VII hostile work 
environment claim.  See Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass’n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318 
(2d Cir. 1999); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996). 
The District Court concluded that the paucity of evidence of workplace 
intimidation or ridicule foreclosed trial on the claims.  We agree.  There is insufficient 
evidence of gender- or age-based harassment severe or pervasive enough to create an 
abusive working environment.  What Slater has proffered is not the stuff of hostile work 
environment claims.  The District Court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.4 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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 The District Court granted summary judgment to the union on the basis that Slater did 
not file a grievance with the union and proceed to arbitration in compliance with the 
procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.  It granted summary 
judgment to McGrail on the basis that Title VII does not impose liability on individuals.  
Because Slater’s hostile work environment claim fails on the merits, we need not address 
these alternative, non-jurisdictional bases for summary judgment.   
